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Abstract. Tag-Based Authorization (TBA) is a hybrid access control model that
combines the ease of use of extensional access control models with the expres-
sivity of logic-based formalisms. The main limitation of TBA is that it lacks sup-
port for policy administration. More precisely, it does not allow policy-writers
to specify administrative policies that constrain the tags that users can assign,
and to verify the compliance of assigned tags with these policies. In this paper
we introduce TBA2 (Tag-Based Authorization & Administration), an extension
of TBA that enables policy administration in distributed systems. We show that
TBA2 is more expressive than TBA and than two reference administrative models
proposed in the literature, namely HRU and ARBAC97.
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1 Introduction
Access control systems in real-world organizations are mostly based on extensional ap-
proaches to access control (e.g., access control lists), as their ease of use is preferred
to the flexibility of logic-based models. Authorization policies in extensional models
are based on simple assignments of rights to users, or on the characterization of users
in terms of properties (e.g., roles) and the assignment of rights based on those prop-
erties. Nevertheless, the lack of expressiveness of extensional models severely limits
the constraints that can be expressed in authorization policies. A hybrid approach to
access control that combines the usability of extensional models and the flexibility and
expressiveness of logic-based formalisms would offer great benefits for the deployment
of access control systems in real-world organizations.
To accommodate this need, Tag-Based Authorization (TBA) has been proposed by
Hinrichs et al. [15], based on the work by Najafian Razavi and Iverson [20] and Wang
et al. [26]. TBA is a hybrid access control model that relies on formal logic for the def-
inition of authorization policies, and on extensional models for describing a system’s
subjects and objects in terms of simple properties (e.g., roles). This integration allows
relatively untrained users to choose descriptive tags for the system’s subjects and ob-
jects; security experts then write logical policies that define access authorizations using
combinations of those tags. The resulting access control model is flexible and easy to
use, yet expressive enough to match the needs of complex application domains.
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As an example application domain for the TBA model, consider Operation Atalanta,
a military operation involving several EU navies that collaborate to prevent criminal
activities (such as smuggling and pirate attacks) off the Somali coast. The information
gathered and exchanged by the collaborating vessels is typically processed and classi-
fied by the vessels’ operators (e.g., a transiting ship is marked as suspicious). Yet, the
policies for accessing this information are regulated by complex context- and content-
based conditions and must be written by higher-rank personnel. By explicitly distin-
guishing the task of characterizing information and the task of writing the authorization
policy, TBA leads to a better separation of duties and valorization of the skills of a
vessel’s workforce than the existing access control models.
If on the one hand allowing low-rank users to assign tags to subjects and objects
greatly enhances the usability of the access control system, on the other hand it en-
ables low-rank users to influence the system’s authorizations. In fact, inaccurate tags
(whether by intention or accident) can circumvent the intended authorization policy of
the system. The main limitation of TBA in this respect is the lack of support for pol-
icy administration. In particular, TBA does not allow policy-writers to: (1) define which
users may assign which tags to which subjects and objects, i.e., to specify administrative
policies; (2) hold users accountable for the tags they assign, and verify the compliance
of tags with administrative policies; and (3) revoke incorrect tags or tags assigned by
unauthorized users. In the scenario above, for instance, it is important to allow only
operators with appropriate clearance to tag sensitive information, and to verify whether
the assigned tags comply with this policy (possibly revoking the tags that do not satisfy
the policy).
In a centralized system, these issues can be addressed by means of a traditional ac-
cess control mechanism that regulates the tagging process and a logging mechanism
that records users’ actions. In a distributed system, however, these solutions are insuf-
ficient as they would require entities in one security domain to trust the enforcement
and logging mechanisms of systems in different security domains. Furthermore, tracing
the objects exchanged in a distributed system might be difficult, complicating or even
preventing the revocation process.
In this paper, we extend the TBA model from [15] to enable policy administration
in distributed systems. In particular, we introduce TBA2 (Tag-Based Authorization &
Administration), an extension of TBA that allows security administrators to specify
constraints on the tagging process and to verify the compliance of tags with adminis-
trative policies by combining traditional “a priori” access control mechanisms with “a
posteriori” verification. Technically, our extension consists of associating an issuer to
each tag, which identifies the user who assigned the tag. For example, all the tags issued
by an operator will be marked with the identifier of the operator. In contrast to previous
work on a posteriori verification (e.g., [7]), this enables policy compliance verification
without the need of an auditing infrastructure, by exploiting the observability of users’
actions (i.e., “signed” tags). As a consequence, TBA2 represents a lightweight solution
for the enforcement of authorization and administrative policies in distributed systems.
We show that the proposed model is more expressive than the original TBA model
and than two well-known administrative models proposed in the literature, namely the
Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullman model [13] and ARBAC97 [23].
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the TBA model and discusses
its limitations. Section 3 introduces TBA2, and Section 4 evaluates its expressive power.
Section 5 discusses related work, and Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Background
Tag-Based Authorization (TBA) [15] is a hybrid access control model combining the
flexibility and expressiveness of logic-based formalism with the ease of use of exten-
sional models. In this section we first present the definitions of the TBA model given
in [15] that are relevant for this paper, and then we identify the main limitations of TBA
with respect to its deployment in a distributed system.
2.1 The TBA Model
In this paper we use S to denote the set of subjects, O to denote the set of objects, and
R to denote the set of rights that can be assigned within a system. T denotes the set
of possible tags that can be assigned to S and O, and tag : S ∪O → 2T is a function
that maps a subject or object to the set of tags assigned to it. Tag denotes the set of all
possible tag functions. A TBA authorization policy is written in some logical access
control language 〈P ,L, |=〉 defined as follows.
Definition 1 (TBA). For a function tag and a logical language 〈P ,L, |=〉, where
– tag: S ∪O → 2T maps a subject or object to the set of tags assigned to it
– P : the set of all authorization rules
– L: the set of queries including allow(s,o,r) for all subjects s, objects o, rights r
– |=: a subset of P × Tag × L
authTBA(s, o, r) if and only if P ′, tag |= allow(s, o, r) for some P ′ ⊆ P .
The operator |= dictates which queries are true given the set of authorization rules P and
a function tag. The following example based on the scenario introduced in Section 1
illustrates TBA using Datalog as the policy language.
Example 1 (TBA). Consider two subjects s1 and s2 and two objects o1 and o2 that are
tagged as follows:
– tag(s1) = {uk navy,operation atalanta,operations specialist}
– tag(s2) = {fr navy}
– tag(o1) = {cargo ship,radar}
– tag(o2) = {gulf of aden,sat 732,high res}
Further, consider the following policy rules:
1. allow(Sx,Ox,read) :- uk navy ∈ tag(Sx), cargo ship ∈ tag(Ox)
2. allow(Sx,Ox,read) :- fr navy ∈ tag(Sx), cargo ship ∈ tag(Ox)
3. allow(Sx,Ox,read) :- operations specialist ∈ tag(Sx), radar ∈ tag(Ox)
4. allow(Sx,Ox,read) :- uk navy ∈ tag(Sx), operation atalanta ∈ tag(Sx),
high res ∈ tag(Ox), sat 732 ∈ tag(Ox)
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This policy allows the members of the British and French Navy (denoted uk navy and
fr navy respectively) to access documents about cargo ships (rules 1 and 2), opera-
tions specialists to access documents about radar systems (rule 3), and all members of
the British Navy serving on Operation Atalanta to access high resolution satellite pho-
tographs taken by sat 732 (rule 4). As a result, subject s1 can access objects o1 and o2,
while subject s2 can only access object o1.
Tag-based authorization differs from standard logical access control models in that the
tag function has a fixed semantics defined outside of the policy. In particular, the se-
mantics of tag is defined by the users of a system, who assign tags to the system’s
subjects and objects. The fixed semantics of tag forces security administrators to de-
fine authorization policies at a higher level of abstraction than the usual S ×O × R.
More precisely, TBA policies are defined over the space of tags 2T × 2T × R, i.e.,
subjects and objects are replaced by tag sets. This abstraction might result in a less
flexible system if the tag-space is not exhaustive enough to accommodate a particular
situation; however, the model can be easily adapted to define policies over (S ∪ 2T )×
(O ∪ 2T )× R (which combines the space of tags and the ones of subjects and objects)
by adding to the set of tags T a tag identifying each subject and object in a system.
In [15], the authors evaluate the expressive power of TBA by expressing a range
of well-known policy idioms. In particular, they show that TBA can be successfully
employed to represent an access matrix, attribute-based access control policies, role-
based access control policies, discretionary access control, mandatory access control,
and three rule types of the RT [18] policy language (namely, all rule types except for
“linked roles”). In addition, their results show that TBA is strictly more expressive than
common access control models such as SDCO [21], ARBAC97 [23], and BLP [3].
2.2 Limitations of TBA
The applicability of TBA is due to a key observation: within a system, the users respon-
sible for creating and categorizing (i.e., tagging) data are usually not in charge and do
not have the expertise to define the security policies governing the system. For example,
on a navy vessel some operators have the task of analyzing the surrounding maritime
traffic and identifying suspicious behaviors, other operators gather intelligence and add
details to these suspicious activities, etc. The policy governing the access to this infor-
mation, on the other hand, is defined by the authorities in command of operations.
By assigning tags to subjects and objects, however, users directly influence the au-
thorizations within a system. For this reason, it is necessary to enable policy-writers
(e.g., security administrators) to control the tagging process. In this respect, we identify
two key issues that are not addressed by the TBA model:
1. Administrative policies: Security administrators should be able to specify policies
defining which users are allowed to assign and revoke which tags to which subjects
and objects. For instance, the security administrator of a navy vessel should be able
to restrict to the commanding officer the right to promote the vessel’s officers to
higher ranks. In addition, it should be possible to regulate the propagation of users’
rights, i.e., the extent to which a user can delegate its tagging rights to other users.
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2. Tag Verification and Revocation: It should be possible to hold users accountable
for the tags they assign, and to verify the compliance of tags with administrative
policies by checking who assigned them. Consider, for instance, a document con-
taining information about a suspected pirate attack, distributed by the French Navy
to its allies in Operation Atalanta. If some tag is added to the document by a user
outside the navy’s system, the security administrator of the French Navy should be
able to verify whether the user was authorized to label the document (e.g., if the
user is an operator of an allied navy, rather than an unknown subject). Accordingly,
“invalid” tags identified in the verification process should be revoked.
Even though some simple administrative policies could be expressed in TBA, the fact
that the “issuer” of a tag is not taken into account by the model makes it impossible
to specify constraints that link tags based on the subject who assigned them (e.g., RT’s
linked roles [18]). Therefore, TBA does not allow the specification of rules such as “a
subject can revoke only the tags that she assigned”, or “a subject can mark a document
as sensitive only if she is (tagged as) a senior officer by a navy that the EU labels as
member of Operation Atalanta”.
More than the specification of administrative policies, however, the major limitation
of TBA is represented by the lack of mechanisms for verifying their enforcement. In a
centralized system, administrative polices can be enforced by means of an access con-
trol system that governs the tagging process. Tag verification can be achieved by means
of a logging mechanism that records all the tags assigned by the system users. Secu-
rity administrators can then simply audit these logs to verify their compliance with the
system’s policies, and revoke the invalid tags identified in the process. In a distributed
system, however, these solutions are insufficient for the following reasons:
1. They require entities in one security domain to trust the administrative policies (and
their enforcement) of systems in different security domains.
2. Since tags may be assigned by users of different systems, and the issuer of a tag is
not considered by the TBA model, verifying the compliance of the tags assigned
by a subject with respect to administrative policies might not be feasible. In fact,
this might require inspecting the logs of possibly all the systems in the distributed
system. It is unlikely, however, that a system would disclose its logs to systems
from a different security domain for auditing purposes. In addition, as information
is exchanged between different systems, tracing the tags assigned by a certain user
(e.g., to revoke them) becomes very difficult, if not impossible.
In the next section we show how the TBA model can be extended to address these
limitations.
3 The TBA2 Model
In this section we present the Tag-Based Authorization & Administration (TBA2) model,
an extension of TBA that enables policy administration in distributed systems. TBA2
extends TBA by associating an issuer to each tag, which identifies the user who assigned
the tag. Intuitively, tags become signed statements issued by a user within a system. For-
mally, we modify the definition of the tag function introduced in Section 2.1 as follows:
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tag : S ∪O → 2S×T , which returns the set of issuer-tag pairs associated to a subject
or object. Representing tags as signed statements is a first step towards addressing the
limitations of TBA mentioned in Section 2.2. In the next subsections we discuss how
TBA2 can solve those limitations in details.
For the sake of simplicity, the solution we propose is based on the assumption that
the set T of possible tags that a user can assign is common to all the systems in the
distributed system. In a real-world distributed system, however, the set of assignable
tags might vary from system to system, as entities in different security domains might
employ different terms to denote similar concepts. Semantic alignment techniques [14,
24] could be required to align the systems’ vocabularies. An additional assumption
we make is that each subject and object belongs to one system, which represents the
security domain where a subject operates, or the system that owns an object (or that has
exclusive rights on it). Given a subject or object identifier, it is possible to determine
the system to which the subject or object belongs.
3.1 Authorization and Administration Policies
Administrative policies constrain the tags that a user is authorized to assign or revoke.
The advantage of TBA2 with respect to TBA is that it links every tag to the user who
assigned it, enabling security administrators to specify fine-grained administrative poli-
cies.
TBA2 requires the set of rights R to include the rights assign tag and revoke tag .
Then, TBA2 is defined as follows.
Definition 2 (TBA2). For a function tag and a logical language 〈P ∪ A,L, |=〉, where
– tag: S ∪O → 2S×T returns the issuer-tag pairs associated to a subject or object
– P : the set of all authorization rules
– A: the set of all administrative rules
– L: the set of queries including allow(s, o, r), allow(s, o, r′, ST ), and
allow(s, s′, r′, ST ) for all subjects s and s′, objects o, rights r, right
r ′ ∈ {assign tag, revoke tag}, and set of signed tags ST ⊆ 2S×T
– |=: a subset of (P ∪A)× Tag × L
authTBA2 (s, o, r) if and only if P ′, tag |= allow(s, o, r)
authTBA2 (s, o, r
′, ST ) if and only if A′, tag |= allow(s, o, r′, ST )
authTBA2 (s, s
′, r′, ST ) if and only if A′, tag |= allow(s, s′, r′, ST )
for some P ′ ⊆ P , A′ ⊆ A.
The following example presents TBA2 authorization and administrative policies.
Example 2 (TBA2). Consider three subjects s1, s2, and s3 and an object o belonging to
a system governed by the British Navy, which are tagged as follows:
– tag(s1) = {(uk navy,senior officer)}
– tag(s2) = {(uk navy,junior officer)}
– tag(s3) = {(uk navy,junior officer)}
– tag(o) = {(uk navy,secret)}
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The subjects’ tags are issued by the British Navy (denoted as “uk navy”) and indicate
that subject s1 has rank senior officer, while s2 and s3 have rank junior officer. Object
o is tagged by the British Navy as secret. The access to object o and the administration
of rights within the system are regulated by the following rules:
1. allow(Sx,o,read) :- (eu,navy) ∈ tag(Sy), (Sy ,senior officer) ∈ tag(Sx)
2. allow(Sx,Ox,assign tag ,{(Sx,Tx)}) :- (eu,navy) ∈ tag(Sy),
(Sy ,senior officer) ∈ tag(Sx),
(eu,navy) ∈ tag(Sz), (Sz ,secret) ∈ tag(Ox)
3. allow(Sx,Sy ,assign tag ,{(Sx,senior officer)}) :- (eu,navy) ∈ tag(Sz),
(Sz ,senior officer) ∈ tag(Sx),
(Sz ,junior officer) ∈ tag(Sy)
4. allow(Sx,Ox,revoke tag ,{(Sx,Tx)}) :- (Sx,Tx) ∈ tag(Ox)
5. allow(Sx,Sy ,revoke tag ,{(Sx,Tx)}) :- (Sx,Tx) ∈ tag(Sy)
The first rule is an authorization rule stating that object o can be read by a subject
Sx if Sx is labeled as senior officer by an EU navy Sy . Rules 2, 3, 4 and 5 are ad-
ministrative rules. Rule 2 allows senior officers of EU navies to assign tags to objects
labeled as secret by any EU navy. Rule 3 allows senior officers of EU navies to as-
sign a senior officer tag to junior officers of the same navy (therefore delegating their
rights). Finally, rules 4 and 5 allow the issuer of a tag to revoke the tag. Assuming tag
(eu,navy) ∈ tag(uk navy), the policy allows subject s1 to read object o and to assign a
senior officer tag to subjects s2 and s3.
3.2 Semantics of Administrative Policies
The effects of the exercise by a subject s of the administrative rights assign tag and
revoke tag for a set of (signed) tags ST are shown in Figure 1. The effects of invoking
allow(s , o, assign tag, ST ) are intuitive, and imply that a tag st (for each st ∈ ST )
is added to the set tag(o). On the other hand, the assignment of a set of tags ST by a
subject s to a subject s′ can be seen as the delegation of some of the rights (or roles)
of s to s′. Delegation can be implemented according to two models: grant or trans-
fer [8]. In the grant model, after a successful delegation both s and s′ are able to benefit
from the delegated rights or roles. On the contrary, according to the transfer model
subject s loses the delegated rights or roles. Figure 1(a) shows the effects of invoking
allow(s , s ′, assign tag, ST ) using the grant model. The transfer model would imply
that all the tags in ST are removed from the set tag(s) after being added to tag(s ′).
Similarly to the tag assignment operation, also the effects of invoking allow(s , s ′,
revoke tag, ST ) depend on the revocation model employed by the system. To motivate
the existence of different revocation models, we describe a scenario based on the tags
and rules in Example 2. Assume that senior officer s1 wants to temporarily delegate her
rights to junior officer s2 because of an emergency. Then, s1 assigns a senior officer
tag to s2. Later, subject s2 delegates her rights to s3, and accordingly assigns tag se-
nior officer to s3. When the emergency is over, s1 returns to her regular duties and
revokes the senior officer tag from s2. Now, the question is whether s3’s senior officer
tag should also be automatically revoked or not.
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allow(s,o,assign tag,ST)
∀ st ∈ ST : tag(o) = tag(o) ∪ {st}
allow(s,s′,assign tag,ST)
∀ st ∈ ST :
tag(s ′) = tag(s ′) ∪ {st}
(a) Semantics of allow(s, o, assign tag , ST ) and allow(s, s ′, assign tag , ST )
allow(s,s′,revoke tag,ST)
∀ st ∈ ST : tag(s ′) = tag(s ′)\{st}
let ST = {(s1 , t1 ), . . . , (sn , tn )}
∀ so ∈ S ∪O , t ∈ T such that (s ′, t) ∈ tag(so)
if ∃A′ ⊆ A such that
A′, tag |= allow(s ′, so, assign tag , {(s ′, t)}) if (s1 , t1 ), . . . , (sn , tn ) ∈ tag(s ′)
and ∀A′′ ⊆ A we have that
A′′, tag  allow(s ′, so, assign tag , {(s ′, t)}) if (s1 , t1 ), . . . , (sn , tn) /∈ tag(s ′)
then
if so ∈ S then
let ST ′ be the set of such tags (s ′, t)
invoke allow(s ′, so, revoke tag , ST ′)
else
tag(so) = tag(so)\{(s ′, t)}
(b) Semantics of allow(s, s ′, revoke tag ,ST ) with Cascading Revocation
allow(s,s′,revoke tag,ST)
∀ st ∈ ST : tag(s ′) = tag(s ′)\{st}
let ST = {(s1 , t1 ), . . . , (sn , tn )}
∀ so ∈ S ∪O , t ∈ T such that (s ′, t) ∈ tag(so)
if ∃A′ ⊆ A such that
A′, tag |= allow(s ′, so, assign tag , {(s ′, t)}) if (s1 , t1 ), . . . , (sn , tn ) ∈ tag(s ′)
and ∀A′′ ⊆ A we have that
A′′, tag  allow(s ′, so, assign tag , {(s ′, t)}) if (s1 , t1 ), . . . , (sn , tn) /∈ tag(s ′)
then
tag(so) = tag(so)\{(s ′, t)} ∪ {(s, t)}
(c) Semantics of allow(s, s ′, revoke tag , ST ) with Non-Cascade Revocation
allow(s,o,revoke tag,ST)
∀ st ∈ ST : tag(o) = tag(o)\{st}
(d) Semantics of allow(s, o, revoke tag , ST )
Fig. 1. Effects of the invocation of rights assign tag and revoke tag
Two main revocation models have been proposed in the literature. The first model,
called cascading revocation [4, 12], aims to overturn all the changes to a system autho-
rizations made exploiting the tags being revoked. This implies that if a subject s revokes
a set of tags ST from a subject s′, then all tags subsequently assigned by s′ (and by the
subjects to which s′ assigned a tag) without other supporting authorizations must be re-
cursively revoked. The effects of invoking allow(s , s ′, revoke tag, ST ) with cascading
revocation are shown in Figure 1(b). A domain that typically resorts to cascading re-
vocation is data protection. Whenever an individual revokes the consent (i.e., the right)
to process her personal data to a service provider, all the authorizations on the data of the
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service provider and of the subcontractors to whom the service provider delegated the
processing of the data are revoked.
The dual model of cascading revocation is called non-cascade revocation [6] (or sim-
ple revocation in [4]). In non-cascade revocation, if a subject s revokes a set of tags ST
from a subject s′, instead of revoking the tags that s′ assigned exploiting the authoriza-
tions deriving from ST (as done by cascading revocation), these tags are modified as if
they were issued by s. Intuitively, this requires s to be allowed to both revoke tags ST
from subject s′ and to assign tags ST in her place. The rationale behind non-cascade
revocation is clarified by the following example. In most organizations, the authoriza-
tions that users possess are related to their role within the organization. Suppose there
is a change in the role of a user s′. This may imply a change also in the privileges of
s′: new rights will be granted to s′ and some of her previous rights will be revoked.
Applying cascading revocation would result in the undesirable effect of deleting all the
authorizations that s′ granted and, recursively, all the authorizations granted through
them, which then might need to be re-issued. Moreover, all the tags assigned by s′ that
depend on the revoked rights would be invalidated. A better solution to this scenario is
to preserve the authorizations granted by user s′, possibly substituting s′ with another
user as the grantor (i.e., issuer) of those authorizations. In [6], for instance, s′ is replaced
by the user s who is revoking her rights. The semantics of allow(s , s ′, revoke tag, ST )
with non-cascade revocation is shown in Figure 1(c).
According to both semantics presented above, since objects cannot fur-
ther delegate their rights to other subjects or objects, the effects of invoking
allow(s , o, revoke tag, ST ) are the same in cascading and non-cascade revocation
(Figure 1(d)).
3.3 Tag Verification
Tag verification is the process of verifying the compliance of tags with administrative
policies. More precisely, the goal of tag verification is to determine whether a user is (or
was) authorized to assign a given tag. Typically, the enforcement of authorization and
administrative policies within a system is achieved by means of a priori access control
mechanisms. In a distributed system, however, relying exclusively on a priori mech-
anisms requires entities in one security domain to trust systems in different security
domains for policy enforcement. Thanks to the observability of users’ actions deriving
from the signing of tags, TBA2 allows security administrators to complement a priori
mechanisms with a posteriori tag verification using a lightweight auditing mechanism.
Technically, we say that a tag t assigned by a subject s to an object o (respectively to
a subject s′) is valid if for a set of administrative rules A′ and a set of signed tags ST
such that (s, t) ∈ ST we have that
A′, tag |= allow(s , o, assign tag, ST ) (resp. A′, tag |= allow(s , s ′, assign tag, ST ))
Otherwise, we say that the tag is invalid. This validity check can be used both as an
a priori mechanism for the enforcement of administrative policies and a posteriori for
auditing purposes.
The verification of a tag (s, t) against the administrative policy of a system might
require the verification of a set of tags (s1, t1), . . . , (sn, tn) against the policies of systems
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in different security domains. In fact, to verify whether tag (s, t) is valid, we need in turn
to verify the validity of the supporting tags of (s, t), i.e., the tags that authorized subject
s to issue (s, t). Consider, for instance, rule 3 in Example 2, which states that “senior
officers of EU navies may assign a senior officer tag to junior officers of the same navy”.
To verify whether the senior officer tag assigned by subject s1 to subject s2 is valid,
we need first to confirm that s1 is actually a senior officer and s2 has a junior officer
tag issued by the same navy. This verification process is similar to the credential chain
discovery problem in trust management. Accordingly, trust management algorithms [19,
25] can be employed to support the verification of tags’ validity.
An additional problem of tag verification is that in a distributed system entities in
one security domain might not trust systems in different security domain to perform the
validity check. In this respect, we identify three types of trust relationships that can be
of interest for tag verification in TBA2, resulting in three possible verification strategies.
In what follows, we refer to the object (resp. subject) to which a tag is assigned as the
target object (resp. subject) of the tag. The first possible verification strategy is issuer
verification of tags, where the system to which the issuer of a tag belongs is trusted
for checking the validity of the tag. The second strategy is target verification, which
enables systems to verify the validity of the tags assigned to an object according to the
intention of the object’s owner. A possible application scenario for target verification is
the protection of digital media, where only the content owner is entitled to define the
authorizations to access the object. Finally, local verification of tags can be employed in
scenarios where there is no mutual trust among systems in different security domains.
With local verification, the system which is interested in verifying the validity of a tag
performs the check with respect to its local administrative policy.
The following example illustrates local verification of tags based on the administra-
tive policy in Example 2.
Example 3 (Tag Verification). The French Navy distributes a document d containing the
location of a suspected pirate attack to the other navies involved in Operation Atalanta.
When d is received by the British Navy, it contains the following tags:
– tag(d) = {(fr navy,secret),(s4,inaccurate information)}
where subject s4 is labeled as follows:
– tag(s4) = {(it navy,reconnaissance pilot)}
Since in Example 2 there is no rule defined by the British Navy that implies allow(s4 , d ,
assign tag, {(s4 , inaccurate information)}), the tag added by subject s4 is consid-
ered invalid. In fact, the policy of the British Navy allows only senior officers to tag
documents marked as secret by an EU navy. The British Navy might thus decide to pro-
ceed with further investigations before concluding the inaccuracy of d’s information.
For the sake of simplicity, the auditing mechanism discussed in this section verifies
the compliance of tags with respect to the administrative policies that are currently in
force. In other words, a tag is considered valid if its assignment is authorized by the
administrative policy in force at the moment in which the tag is verified. An alternative
verification mechanism could verify tags with respect to the administrative policy in
force at the moment in which the tag was assigned. Intuitively, the implementation of
172 S. Etalle et al.
the latter mechanism is more complex and requires, e.g., timestamped tags and repos-
itories containing all the administrative policies adopted by a system over time. An
extension of the TBA2 model in this direction is discussed in Section 6.
3.4 Tag Revocation
Whenever security administrators identify invalid tags, they should revoke them to pre-
serve the consistency of function tag with respect to administrative policies. In a cen-
tralized system, revocation can be performed by simply deleting incorrect tags from the
system. In a distributed system, revoking a set of tags is more complicated because it
might not be possible to trace the tags issued by a given subject, and security adminis-
trators cannot delete tags assigned to subjects and objects residing in different security
domains. TBA2 enables a simple solution to this problem, where security administra-
tors communicate the issuer-tag pairs to be revoked to other systems by broadcasting or
publishing in an appropriate location revocation lists of tags. The recipient systems can
then decide whether to revoke the listed tags or ignore the recommendation.
Definition 3 (Revocation List). A revocation list is a triple 〈s , so,T ′〉 where T ′ ⊆ T
is a set of tags, s is the issuer of the tags in T ′, and so is the target subject or object.
Intuitively, a revocation list contains the set T ′ of tags assigned by a subject s to subject
or object so which should be revoked according to the system publishing the revocation
list.
Example 4 (Revocation List). The revocation list for the invalid tag identified by the
British Navy in Example 3 is the following: 〈s4 , d , {inaccurate information}〉. The
revocation list is published by the British Navy on its public record of invalid tags.
The decision of the security administrator of a system sys on whether to actually revoke
the set of tags listed in a revocation list 〈s , so,T ′〉 published by a system sys ′ is strictly
correlated to the verification strategy employed by sys . If sys resorts to issuer (resp.
target) verification, for instance, sys trusts the system to which s (resp. so) belongs to
perform the validity check of tags T ′. Consequently, if s (resp. so) belongs to sys ′, the
security administrator of sys is likely to delete tags T ′ from its system. On the contrary,
if sys resorts to local verification, it might decide to proceed with further investigations
before deleting the tags. The revocation list published by the British Navy in Example
4, for instance, might be taken into consideration by the vessels of the British Navy, but
ignored by the vessels of other EU countries, because derived through local verification
with respect to the British Navy’s policy.
As an alternative to revocation lists, we consider the use of negative tags. Negative
tags are signed tags that state that a certain tag assigned to a subject or object is not (or
no longer) valid according to the issuer of the negative tag. The advantage of negative
tags is that they enable the verification of revoked tags, which might not be possible
if the tags are deleted. However, this might lead to a very large number of tags (both
“positive” and negative) assigned to each subject and object.
Rather than simply deleting invalid tags (or issuing negative tags), other approaches
can be employed for restoring the compliance of tags with administrative policies.
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In some critical or uncertain situation, for instance, security administrators might de-
cide to simply highlight the invalid tags and refer to a competent user for determining
what to do with them. Alternatively, systems may rely on repair constraints [11] to de-
termine how to handle invalid tags. A repair constraint might, for example, dictate in
which conditions cascading rather than non-cascade revocation should be applied on a
tag.
4 Evaluation of TBA2
In this section we evaluate the expressive power of the TBA2 model. First, it is easy to
demonstrate that TBA2 is strictly more expressive than TBA. In fact, by not bounding
the tags’ issuers, TBA2 can express exactly the same constraints definable by TBA. On
top of this, associating an issuer to each tag enables the specification of authorization
and administrative rules discriminating based on the issuer of tags, such as for instance
linked roles in RT [18]. A linked role is a rule of the form A.r ← B .r1 .r2 , which states
that subject A assigns a subject Sx (implicitly defined) to role r if Sx is labeled as a
member of role r2 by a subject Sy who is assigned to role r1 by subject B. The reason
why linked roles cannot be represented in TBA is that they require the binding of the
subject of the first role r1 to the issuer of the second role r2. TBA2 rules 1, 2, and 3 in
Example 2 are examples of RT’s linked roles.
We now show how TBA2 can represent policies from two reference administrative
models proposed in the literature, namely the Harrison, Ruzzo, and Ullman (HRU)
model [13] and ARBAC97 [23]. The HRU model [13] employs an access matrix for
the specification of the rights of users on the objects in a system, and relies on a set
of commands for modifying users’ authorizations. The model includes three predefined
commands: commands CONFER and REVOKE allow the owner of an object to re-
spectively grant to and revoke from other subjects any right on the objects she owns;
command TRANSFER allows users to delegate their rights to other users. In TBA2 we
use allow(s , o, assign tag,T ′) to define commands CONFER and TRANSFER, and
allow(s , o, revoke tag,T ′) to define the REVOKE command. We assume the tags in T
to consist of pairs 〈s , r〉, representing each possible right r ∈ R of a subject s ∈ S. The
tags associated to an object define the rights of the users of a system on that object.
Example 5 (Mapping HRU to TBA2). The following three rules define commands CON-
FER, TRANSFER, and REVOKE respectively:
1. allow(Sx,Ox,assign tag ,{(Sy,Rx)}) :- (sys ,〈Sx,own〉) ∈ tag(Ox)
2. allow(Sx,Ox,assign tag ,{(Sy,Rx)}) :- (sys ,〈Sz ,own〉) ∈ tag(Ox),
(Sz ,〈Sx,R∗x〉)∈ tag(Ox)
3. allow(Sx,Ox,revoke tag ,{(Sy,Rx)}) :- (sys ,〈Sx,own〉) ∈ tag(Ox)
The first rule states that the owner Sx of an object Ox can assign any right Rx on Ox to
any subject Sy . The tag representing the ownership of an object is a “system tag”; we
use sys to denote the issuer of system tags. Rule 2 represents the right of a subject Sx
to delegate a right Rx on object Ox to a subject Sy, provided that Rx is a transferable
right (denoted by symbol ∗ in the HRU model) assigned to Sx by the owner Sz of object
Ox. Finally, rule 3 states that the owner of an object can revoke any right on that object.
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Note that the HRU model allows users to define additional commands to modify the au-
thorizations within a system. Since those commands are arbitrary, and are not described
in the model, we cannot evaluate the expressiveness of TBA2 with respect to them.
Next, we show how to represent in TBA2 the administrative policies supported by
ARBAC97 [23], an administrative model for role-based access control. In ARBAC97,
roles are divided into two classes: administrative roles and regular roles. Both classes
of roles are organized into hierarchies, where each role inherits all the rights assigned
to the children nodes in the hierarchy. The ARBAC97 model relies on four commands
for the specification of administrative policies:
1. can assign(ar , φ, {rr1 , . . . , rrn})
2. can revoke(ar , {rr1 , . . . , rrn})
3. can assignp(ar , φ, {rr1 , . . . , rrn})
4. can revokep(ar , {rr1 , . . . , rrn})
where φ (called prerequisite condition) is a boolean expression on regular roles, which
defines the requirements on the membership (or non-membership) of a user to some
roles. Commands (1) and (2) are used to specify the right to assign and revoke roles,
while commands (3) and (4) define the rights to assign and revoke permissions. More
precisely, command (1) defines the right of a member of the administrative role ar (or
a member of an administrative role above ar in the hierarchy) to assign to a user who
satisfies the prerequisite conditions φ the membership to regular roles rr1, . . . , rrn.
Command (2) assigns to members of the administrative role ar (or higher roles in the
hierarchy) the right to revoke regular roles rr1, . . . , rrn. Similarly, command (3) al-
lows members of the administrative role ar (or higher) to assign to roles rr1, . . . , rrn
any permission whose assignment to regular roles satisfies φ, and command (4) enables
members of ar (or higher) to revoke any right to roles rr1, . . . , rrn. To represent AR-
BAC97, we consider a set of administrative rolesAR and regular roles RR to be defined
as tags in T . The assignment of a user to a role is represented by the assignment of a
tag from RR to the user. In addition, similarly to the previous example, we employ tags
consisting of pairs 〈s , r〉 to represent a right r ∈ R of a subject s ∈ S. Finally, for rep-
resenting a prerequisite condition φ, we rewrite φ in disjunctive normal form, i.e., into
a formula of the form (CR11 ∧ . . . ∧CR1m1 ) ∨ . . . ∨ (CRp1 ∧ . . . ∧ CRpmp ), where
CRij (with i ∈ {1, . . . , p}, j ∈ {1, . . . ,mi}) is either crij or ¬crij , with crij ∈ RR,
and the negation symbol ¬ denotes non-membership to a regular role. Negation as fail-
ure is employed to interpret negated roles: a user is not a member of a role crij if she is
not assigned a tag (s,crij ), for any s ∈ S.
Example 6 (Mapping ARBAC97 to TBA2). The following TBA2 rules define ARBAC97
commands (1), (2), (3), and (4) respectively:
1. allow(Sx,Sy ,assign tag ,{(Sx,rr1),. . .,(Sx,rrn)}) :- (∗,ar) ∈ tag(Sx), (∗,cr11) 
tag(Sy),
. . ., (∗,cr1m1)  tag(Sy)
· · ·
allow(Sx,Sy ,assign tag ,{(Sx,rr1),. . .,(Sx,rrn)}) :- (∗,ar) ∈ tag(Sx), (∗,crp1) 
tag(Sy),
. . ., (∗,crpmp)  tag(Sy)
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2. allow(Sx,Sy ,revoke tag ,{(∗,rr1),. . . ,(∗,rrn)}) :- (∗,ar) ∈ tag(Sx)
3. allow(Sx,Sy ,assign tag ,{(Sx,〈Sy ,Rx〉)}) :- (∗,ar) ∈ tag(Sx), (∗,rr1) ∈ tag(Sy),
(∗,cr11) ∈ tag(Scr11), (∗,〈Scr11 ,Rx〉)  tag(Ocr11),
. . .,
(∗,cr1m1) ∈ tag(Scr1m1 ), (∗,〈Scr1m1 ,Rx〉) 
tag(Ocr1m1 )· · ·
allow(Sx,Sy ,assign tag ,{(Sx,〈Sy ,Rx〉)}) :- (∗,ar) ∈ tag(Sx), (∗,rrn) ∈ tag(Sy),
(∗,crp1) ∈ tag(Scrp1), (∗,〈Scrp1 ,Rx〉)  tag(Ocrp1),
. . .,
(∗,crpmp) ∈ tag(Scrpmp ), (∗,〈Scrpmp ,Rx〉) 
tag(Ocrpmp )
4. allow(Sx,Sy ,revoke tag ,{(∗,〈Sy,Rx〉)}) :- (∗,ar) ∈ tag(Sx), (∗,rr1) ∈ tag(Sy)
· · ·
allow(Sx,Sy ,revoke tag ,{(∗,〈Sy,Rx〉)}) :- (∗,ar) ∈ tag(Sx), (∗,rrn) ∈ tag(Sy)
where ∗ indicates any subject in S, and  is either ∈ or /∈ depending on the correspond-
ing element in φ. The first set of rules allows a subject Sx with administrative role ar
to assign to a subject Sy whose roles satisfy the formula (CRi1 ∧ . . . ∧ CRimi ) (for
any i ∈ {1, . . . , p}) to regular roles rr1, . . . , rrn. The second rule allows a member
Sx of administrative role ar to revoke to a subject Sy regular roles rr1, . . . , rrn, inde-
pendently from the subject who assigned them. The set of rules in item 3 states that a
subject Sx who is a member of administrative role ar may assign a right Rx to a subject
Sy , provided that Sy is a member of regular role rrj (with j ∈ {1, . . . , n}), and Rx is a
right whose assignment to regular roles satisfies (CRi1 ∧ . . . ∧ CRimi ). Finally, the set
of rules in item 4 gives to a subject Sx having administrative role ar the right to revoke
any right to the members of role rrj .
In the example above we do not consider inheritance of rights among roles in a hierar-
chy. Rather, we assume that a rule is defined for each administrative role ar having a cer-
tain right. A role hierarchy could be easily defined using a predicate higher role(ar1 ,
ar2 ), and adding to each rule a condition higher role(ar , armin ), where armin is the
minimum role in the hierarchy to which the rule applies. In addition, we slightly mod-
ify the semantics of commands (3) and (4). Whereas in ARBAC97 permissions are as-
signed to roles, in our representation they are assigned to the members of a role. From
the practical point of view, however, the two semantics are equivalent.
The examples above demonstrate that TBA2 can express the administrative con-
straints defined by HRU and ARBAC97. As a matter of fact, neither HRU nor AR-
BAC97 fully exploit the expressiveness of TBA2. As shown by Example 6, for instance,
ARBAC97 does not exploit the capability of TBA2 of constraining the issuer of a tag
and the rights that a member of an administrative role may assign. With respect to
the HRU model, TBA2 allows for the specification of much more complex constraints
than those defined in commands CONFER, TRANSFER, and REVOKE, e.g., based on
the properties of subjects and objects. This implies that, in terms of expressive power,
TBA2 represents a more comprehensive solution than the considered models.
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5 Related Work
TBA has been studied informally in [20, 26], though that work allows tags on subjects
but not on objects. Next to it, substantial work has been done on logical access control
models, both based on Datalog (e.g., [2, 18, 22]) as well as on more expressive logics
(e.g., [1, 9, 27]). While many of the existing logical access control languages can be
used to encode tag-based authorization policies, it is the commitment to document and
user tagging (an activity that can be carried out by users with a wide range of technical
expertise) that makes TBA useful to a broad class of organizations.
The work related to the contributions of this paper spans two main topics: policy
administration and auditing mechanisms. While many access control models for dis-
tributed systems have been proposed in the literature, policy administration received
much less consideration. A number of administration models exist [4, 5, 10, 13, 17, 23],
but they focus mainly on the expressivity of administrative policies, and do not consider
the challenges associated with their enforcement in a distributed setting. The innovation
of TBA2 in this respect lies in the fact that it allows for an easy verification of policy
compliance, thus not requiring entities in one security domain to trust systems in differ-
ent security domains for the enforcement of administrative policy. In addition, we have
shown that TBA2 is more expressive than two reference administrative models, namely
ARBAC97 [23] and HRU [13].
Similarly to TBA2, the existing a posteriori solutions (e.g., [7]) perform the verifi-
cation of policy compliance through auditing mechanisms. However, to achieve this,
they rely on logging mechanisms that record users’ actions, and trusted auditing au-
thorities that verify the compliance of those actions with policies. Our model represents
a lightweight solution for policy compliance verification that does not require the re-
alization of such an auditing infrastructure. We propose the use of trust management
algorithms [19, 25] to support the verification of policy compliance.
6 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we have introduced TBA2, an extension of the TBA model [15] that en-
ables policy administration in distributed systems. Similarly to TBA, TBA2 allows rel-
atively untrained users to assign descriptive tags to a system’s subjects and objects;
trained security experts then write logic-based authorization policies that define access
rights in terms of those tags. In addition, by linking each tag to its issuer (i.e., the user
who assigned it), TBA2 enables the specification of fine-grained administrative policies
whose enforcement can be verified through a lightweight auditing technique. We have
shown that our model is more expressive than TBA and than the HRU [13] and AR-
BAC97 [23] administrative models. Thus, TBA2 represents a flexible, easy to use, yet
expressive access control solution which matches the needs of real-world organizations.
The auditing mechanism proposed in Section 3.3 verifies tags’ validity with respect
to the administrative policy currently in force within a system. In some situations, how-
ever, it is preferable to verify the validity of a tag with respect to the administrative
policies effective when the tag was issued. For example, assume that the commanding
officer of a British Navy vessel is summoned by the EU for a meeting at the Operation
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Atalanta’s headquarter. Then, the commanding officer would have to temporarily dele-
gate the command of the vessel and the deriving responsibilities and authorizations to
another officer until her return. During this period, the appointed officer will have to
take several decisions which might lead to the granting and revocation of authorizations
to the vessel’s operators and to the tagging of several data objects exchanged among
the collaborating navies. With the verification mechanism presented in Section 3.3, the
revocation of the officer’s rights by the commanding officer upon her return would have
the undesirable effect of invalidating all the authorizations and tags assigned by the
officer during her command. The design of an auditing mechanism verifying tags’ va-
lidity with respect to the administrative policy in force when a tag was assigned would
require two main extensions to the TBA2 model. First, it would require the association
of a timestamp to each tag to demonstrate when it was issued. Second, all the adminis-
trative policies employed by a system during its lifetime would need to be stored in a
repository, together with the time interval in which they were effective. Then, whenever
a tag needs to be verified, its timestamp can be used to retrieve from the repository the
policy that was in force when the tag was issued, against which the validity check must
be performed. The resulting enforcement mechanism is similar to those used for the
enforcement of history-based access control policies [16].
To conclude, we point out that the model proposed in this paper enables security
administrators to verify the compliance of users’ actions with respect to the adminis-
trative policies in force within a system, but provides no guarantee that these policies
are correctly specified. The verification of administrative policies with respect to the
desired security properties of a system can be achieved through model checking tech-
niques [28]. Finally, we argue that even though TBA2 is presented as an access control
solution for distributed systems, also centralized systems would benefit from employing
the model. In fact, the association of each tag to its issuer enhances the “observability”
of user’s actions, simplifying the detection of policy violations, and may be used as a
discriminant by other users in the system to determine whether a certain tag should be
considered valid. Signed tags are currently employed by several existing web applica-
tions and social networks (e.g., Facebook).
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